path: root/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
diff options
authorJouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>2014-11-21 15:02:00 (GMT)
committerJouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>2014-11-21 15:02:00 (GMT)
commitf23c5b17e1016c38d6068b279c17f588ec75b409 (patch)
tree84586affc9ca1353b7e2a7c0ee5e48c6ce403a57 /src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
parentdb099951cb35daff8dbab0215c719d9a763ced6f (diff)
AP: Extend EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 retry workaround for changing SNonce
If the 4-way handshake ends up having to retransmit the EAPOL-Key message 1/4 due to a timeout on waiting for the response, it is possible for the Supplicant to change SNonce between the first and second EAPOL-Key message 2/4. This is not really desirable due to extra complexities it causes on the Authenticator side, but some deployed stations are doing this. This message sequence looks like this: AP->STA: EAPOL-Key 1/4 (replay counter 1, ANonce) AP->STA: EAPOL-Key 1/4 (replay counter 2, ANonce) STA->AP: EAPOL-Key 2/4 (replay counter 1, SNonce 1) AP->STA: EAPOL-Key 3/4 (replay counter 3, ANonce) STA->AP: EAPOL-Key 2/4 (replay counter 2, SNonce 2) followed by either: STA->AP: EAPOL-Key 4/4 (replay counter 3 using PTK from SNonce 1) or: AP->STA: EAPOL-Key 3/4 (replay counter 4, ANonce) STA->AP: EAPOL-Key 4/4 (replay counter 4, using PTK from SNonce 2) Previously, Authenticator implementation was able to handle the cases where SNonce 1 and SNonce 2 were identifical (i.e., Supplicant did not update SNonce which is the wpa_supplicant behavior) and where PTK derived using SNonce 2 was used in EAPOL-Key 4/4. However, the case of using PTK from SNonce 1 was rejected ("WPA: received EAPOL-Key 4/4 Pairwise with unexpected replay counter" since EAPOL-Key 3/4 TX and following second EAPOL-Key 2/4 invalidated the Replay Counter that was used previously with the first SNonce). This commit extends the AP/Authenticator workaround to keep both SNonce values in memory if two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages are received with different SNonce values. The following EAPOL-Key 4/4 message is then accepted whether the MIC has been calculated with the latest SNonce (the previously existing behavior) or with the earlier SNonce (the new extension). This makes 4-way handshake more robust with stations that update SNonce for each transmitted EAPOL-Key 2/4 message in cases where EAPOL-Key message 1/4 needs to be retransmitted. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h')
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
index 6960ff3..7ce5caf 100644
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
Boolean GUpdateStationKeys;
+ u8 alt_SNonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
+ u8 alt_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
struct wpa_ptk PTK;
Boolean PTK_valid;
@@ -84,6 +86,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
unsigned int mgmt_frame_prot:1;
unsigned int rx_eapol_key_secure:1;
unsigned int update_snonce:1;
+ unsigned int alt_snonce_valid:1;
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
unsigned int ft_completed:1;
unsigned int pmk_r1_name_valid:1;